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INTRODUCTION
The Act on Fiscal Responsibility and the Fiscal Council was
adopted by Parliament at the end of 2008 (Act LXXV of
2008). Our article first describes the operation of the new
fiscal framework and then briefly evaluates the new rules on
the basis of the Kopits–Symansky criteria.
In a general sense, the fiscal rules can be interpreted as a
regulation containing a permanent, numerical constraint on
the decision-makers of fiscal policy. Before the adoption of
the aforementioned act there were two fiscal rules in
Hungary.
The more comprehensive rule is the fiscal framework of the
European Union, which has applied to Hungary as well since
its accession in 2004. Its basic element is the ceiling of 3 per
cent for the deficit and 60 per cent for the debt-to-GDP ratio
of the government sector, as stipulated in the Maastricht
Treaty, which serves as a basis for the European Union. The
other, complementary element is a preventive/disciplinary
fiscal framework, put into effect by the Stability and Growth
Pact for the adequate functioning of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). The aim of the preventive
regulations is to prevent the development of an excessive
fiscal deficit. As a first step, a minimum benchmark value of
deficit was determined for each country. If this benchmark is
complied with, the 3 per cent deficit ceiling is not jeopardised
during the usual fluctuation of the economic cycle. In the
second step, a medium-term objective (MTO) – stricter than
the minimum benchmark value – can be set, which has to be
attained gradually by the member countries which joined
EMU and the states participating in ERM II, which is
considered to be the ‘waiting room’ before the adoption of
the euro.
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The internal rule limiting local governments’ indebtedness
has been in force for a longer period of time. Act LXV of
1990 on Local Governments has determined the maximum
degree of local governments’ annual debt service since 1997.
Based on the rule, the theoretical debt limit is the perpetuity
value of 70% of own revenues reduced by short-term
liabilities. On the one hand, this value exceeds the tolerance
level which is in conformity with responsible financial
management, and on the other hand, it does not restrain the
path of reaching the limit (in the event of a low starting level,
it can allow a significant deficit and indebtedness in a given
year).
The act adopted in December 2008 was preceded by a similar
bill. The public finances package drafted in the summer of 2007
consisted of three bills, but in the end it was not debated in
The Law on Fiscal Responsibility adopted late 2008 is a new element in Hungarian fiscal policy, although not without
precedent. Under the law, the Parliament and the Government limit themselves to prevent high fiscal deficits and a further
increase in public indebtedness, experienced in recent years. Budget planning turns into a three-year process, hardening over
time. As a first step, the targeted primary (non-interest) budget balance is subject to the requirement that the stock of
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reflecting the effect of so-called automatic stabilizers-attributable to factors beyond the control of the authorities. This means
that the actual deficit is not necessarily equal to the deficit path consistent with the real debt limit, but it may fluctuate around
this trend over the medium term. In addition, the law prescribes observance of the pay-go principle. Finally, it provides for the
establishment of an independent Fiscal Council entrusted with monitoring compliance with the rules and with transparency
standards. We evaluated the law according to the Kopits–Symansky criteria applied in the international literature. In most
aspects, the law exhibits favourable properties, consistent with the criteria, although inevitably at the expense of simplicity. The
assessment suggests that the law would benefit from extending coverage of the rules to local governments. Moreover,
enforceability of the rules would be strengthened if the law were adopted by a qualified legislative majority.
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1The MTO values – cyclically adjusted and excluding one-off measures – approved by country range between a deficit of 1 per cent of GDP (low debt/high growth
potential) and a balanced equilibrium or surplus (high debt/low growth potential).Parliament. (For its evaluation, see Kopits, 2007; for the
background, see the articles of the 2007/2 issue of the Public
Finance Quarterly.) Within this package, the first proposal can
be considered as the antecedent of the act which is entering into
force now, because it contained the ideas regarding the state
budget rule and the establishment of a Fiscal Office. The
difference between these proposals and the one adopted is that
the former did not include an expenditure ceiling. The proposal
regarding the Office is also different to some extent from the
Fiscal Council which is being established. One of the differences
is that the existence and functions of the Office would have
been laid down in the Constitution. In addition, the amendment
to the Constitution would have made the law regulating the
operation and transparency of the general government a two-
thirds (qualified) act. The third part would have replaced the act
on local governments with a regulation similar to the ‘golden
rule’, which would have permitted indebtedness only as a
proportion of local government investment.
OPERATION OF THE FISCAL
FRAMEWORK
The aim of this set of rules is to maintain the level of the real
value of government debt (central government debt).
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Accordingly, every year the nominal value of debt may grow
only to the same extent as inflation. With real GDP growth, this
would mean a gradual decline in government debt measured as
a ratio of GDP. The law determines not only the objective, but
also the means of attaining it, which is practically the reform of
fiscal planning. Fiscal planning will be a rolling three-year
process, in each year of which the debt level to be attained three
years later must be set. At the end of the period, the actual debt
can be different from the one envisaged, because the budget act
does not have to react to the cyclical fluctuations of the
economy or the interest rate level. Over the longer term, if the
economic forecast is realistic, and does not contain any
systematic error, the total effect of economic cycles is neutral,
so the expected value of debt will really be the designated debt
path. As a result of the three-year planning cycle, 2012 is the
first year for which a budget can be prepared in line with the
law. In the period until then, transitional provisions limiting the
increase in fiscal expenditures apply.
The act also provides for the establishment of a new
institution, the Fiscal Council. The Fiscal Council consists of
three persons; its work is aided by a secretariat consisting of
permanent staff. This body prepares macroeconomic
forecasts and a baseline projection for budget figures as well
as methodological recommendations relating to fiscal
planning. Based on its own forecast and calculations, it also
comments on the budget and supplementary budget bills and
on all provisions of law which may have an impact on the
budget. Preparation of the baseline projection is very
important, because this is the economic forecast based on
which the level of fiscal debt is determined three years in
advance. The as-precise-as-possible, but at least undistorted
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baseline forecast (see box text) is a pre-condition for the
proper functioning of the law. The Council’s powers extend
to forming an opinion, but it does not have any legal means
if the submitted bill is not in conformity with the provisions
of the act. The Council and the secretariat will expand their
scope of duties gradually until reaching the complete range
stipulated by law. The Council will prepare macroeconomic
forecasts starting from 1 July 2009, will give its opinion on
the budget act starting from 1 July 2010, and will perform all
of its tasks required by law from 1 January 2011 onwards.
Pursuant to the transitional provisions, in 2010 and 2011, at
real value, the consolidated adjusted primary expenditure of
the state budget may increase by one-half of the real GDP
growth rate at most. With the expected low economic growth
this would practically mean keeping the level of the real value
of expenditures in 2010 and a slight increase in 2011.
The fiscal rule determined in the law applies to the budgets
starting from 2012. It requires keeping constant the level of
the real value of fiscal debt and a limited growth rate of
expenditures (expenditure ceiling). Fiscal rolling planning
becomes a three-year process, in which new pieces of
information and forecasts overwrite earlier plans to a certain
extent. As time passes, the decision-maker’s room for
manoeuvre steadily narrows.
– Pursuant to the rule, the level of government debt to be
attained by the end of year t must be determined three years
in advance (in year t-3) on the basis of the inflation
forecast, and the primary balance necessary for achieving
this as well as the expenditure ceiling as a way of attaining
the primary balance must be fixed.
4 The envisaged primary
balance may not have a deficit.
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2The debt rule does not apply to local governments. Central government consists of the central budget, the social security funds and the decentralised funds. Of the
three subsectors only the central budget has debts. The act calls the consolidated gross debt of the three subsectors ‘government debt’; the difference between the
latter and the ‘general government debt’is mainly the debt of local governments.
3 In this case, undistorted forecast means that factual data will be somewhat below or above the forecast with the same probability, i.e. the projection is not
systematically too optimistic or pessimistic.
4 A given objective (reduction of deficit) can be attained through various combinations of increasing revenues and reducing expenditures. The degree of expenditure
cut is determined by the expenditure ceiling. Therefore, theoretically it is also possible to adopt a restrained ceiling, which also allows for tax reduction, in parallel with
a given objective (deficit reduction).– For two years in advance (in year t-2) the balance of the so-
called discretionary items, which can be changed by
government decision, must be fixed in a way to be in line
with the primary balance envisaged one year earlier. This
requires knowledge of mandatory items (see box text),
stemming from the baseline projection prepared by the
Council.
– In the course of planning the detailed budget act (in year 
t-1), the government cannot deviate from the value of the
discretionary items given this way even if in the meantime
the expected balance of the mandatory, exogenous items
changes. This means that the law does not require reacting
to short-term shocks; it allows the functioning of automatic
stabilisers. All this means that if the change in
macroeconomic parameters alters the expected balance of
mandatory items, no reaction in the balance of the
discretionary items is required. Consequently, the expected
primary balance will deviate from the envisaged one. The
Council’s baseline projection represents a fundamental
reference value during the budget debate as well, because in
the balance of the proposed changes neither the deficit nor
the balance of mandatory items can be changed. This
compulsory offsetting ensures the observance of the rule.
Accordingly, based on the rule, unchanged real debt
functions as a several-year anchor, but the detailed budget
bill for year t submitted to Parliament does not have to
contain a year-end debt which equals the objective
determined earlier. In addition, fiscal developments in a
given year may also result in a departure from the objective.
Consequently, fiscal debt will be exactly identical with the
envisaged value only in exceptional cases, i.e. ‘by chance’.
Trend-like deviation from the targeted debt path may be
prevented by two brakes. On the one hand, this can be
safeguarded by the baseline projection prepared by the Fiscal
Council, which is in principle undistorted. On the other
hand, this can be avoided by the rule stipulating that the real
value of the debt determined for the given year in year t-3
must equal either the debt level of year t-1 or of year t-4,
whichever is the lower at real value. The latter ensures that
possible overshooting in debt does not result in a change in
the trend, but the debt returns to the path which excludes
the outlier.
The example below shows how the multiyear planning would
take place for 2015. The primary budget balance target in
billion forints for 2015 must be determined as early as in
2012 in such a manner that the value of the end-2015
government debt exceeds the lower of either the debt
expected for end-2014 or the year 2011 fiscal debt by the
rate of inflation at most. In addition, it must be determined
to what extent expenditures are permitted to increase at real
value in 2015 compared to the 2014 level. In 2013, new
economic and fiscal forecasts will have to be prepared for
2015. Based on the baseline projection, the balance of
mandatory items expected for 2015 must be estimated in
billion forints as precisely as possible, then the balance
requirement of discretionary items for 2015 – expressed in
billion forints – must be determined in a way that the
expected primary balance equals the one set in the previous
year. The detailed fiscal plan for 2015 must be drafted in
2014. On the one hand, the balance of discretionary items in
it must meet the balance requirement defined a year earlier,
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Baseline projection and the separation of the so-called discretionary and
mandatory items are important new concepts in the law. The baseline
projection is a forecast of fiscal data for several years, which presumes
unchanged fiscal policy. In this respect, a distinction can be made
between discretionary items, which are those revenues and
expenditures that the budget act can influence, and mandatory items,
which are influenced by macroeconomic and demographic
developments or regulated by other provisions of law, independently of
the budget act. For example, tax revenues which are determined partly
by the tax laws and partly by economic developments belong to
exogenous items. Consequently, most revenues are mandatory items,
except for the tax burden of public wages as well as goods and services
purchases of the general government, which follows the changes in
expenditures automatically. However, most of the expenditures are
discretionary items, except for pensions, payments to the EU and some
other items (interest expenditure).
Box 1: The difference between mandatory-discretionary items and the baseline projection
Chart 1
Separation of consolidated primary discretional
and mandatory items as interpreted by the MNB





































Per centand on the other hand, the real growth rate of primary
expenditures compared to 2014 must comply with the
conditions fixed in 2012. However, mandatory items may
deviate from what was envisaged in the previous year,
because they depend on economic developments, and the
economic path expected for 2015 may change. As a result of
mandatory items, the balance in the detailed budget act may
be different from the one determined earlier. The
government must submit a supplementary budget if, based on
the baseline projection, it turns out during the year that the
balance of the current year will be worse than the planned
balance by more than 0.2 per cent of planned GDP, and this
is not attributable to macroeconomic or demographic effects.
By keeping constant the level of the real value of government
debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio declines from year to year if real
GDP increases. If real debt really remains at an unchanged
level, the debt-to-GDP ratio practically does not depend on
any other factor but economic growth. The underlying
reason is that inflation raises debt and the gross domestic
product at the same rate.
5 Although the value of government
debt is also affected by exchange rate developments through
the revaluation of the foreign currency denominated debt,
the law does not specify how this is to be taken into account.
Over the long term, we may even ignore the revaluation
effect, because with the adoption of the euro it will evidently
cease to exist. However, we must emphasise that in the case
of a long-term projection like this demographic effects also
have to be reckoned with. For the compliance with the real
debt rule, the increasing pressure on the budget owing to the
aging of society requires structural reforms or significant cuts
in expenditures in other areas. As a result of the high degree
of uncertainty of parameters, the debt paths shown in Table
1 can only be considered as estimates, although they roughly
illustrate what debt ratio can be attained over the longer
horizon by obeying the law. They also demonstrate that
obeying the rule will allow a reduction of the gross debt-to-
GDP ratio below 60 per cent over the medium term against
the background of an average 5 per cent GDP growth
between 2010 and 2015. As even in the best case growth of
not more than 4 per cent can be presumed for these five
years, if debt has to be reduced below 60 per cent at a faster
pace in accordance with the EU’s requirements, a somewhat
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Chart 2


























5 For calculating the increase in volume from the change in the nominal level of GDP instead of inflation normally we use the GDP deflator, but now, for the sake of
simplicity, we consider it equal to the consumer price index on the average of the longer period.
6 Gross debt can certainly be repaid to some extent by reducing the holdings of financial assets (deposits, state ownership) as well.
* For 2010, the table shows the debt forecast based on the background calculations of the February issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation. This
forecast may change, depending on the developments in deficit, exchange rate and GDP. The impact of the coming into force of the debt rule will be
felt after 2011.
1% 2% 3% 4%
2008 fact 69% 69% 69% 69%
2010 forecast 77% 77% 77% 77%
2015 73% 70% 66% 63%
2020 70% 63% 57% 52%
2025 66% 57% 49% 43%
2030
simulation
63% 52% 43% 35%
2035 60% 47% 37% 29%
2040 57% 42% 32% 24%
2045 54% 38% 27% 20%
2050 52% 35% 24% 16%
Table 1
Changes in gross government debt as a percentage of GDP under various annual average economic
growth scenarios*If the nominal value of government debt increases from year
to year only by the rate of inflation, this means that the fiscal
deficit cannot exceed the product of the previous year’s debt
and inflation of the given year. Using technical terms, it
postulates a balanced operational position. Namely, the
traditional (nominal) fiscal balance – among other methods –
can be broken down into the public interest expenditures and
the primary balance, which does not contain interest
expenditures. Interest expenditure, in turn, can further be
broken down into expenditure compensating the state’s
creditors because of inflation and the interest expenditure to
be paid on the basis of the real interest rate. The operational
balance is the sum of the primary balance and the interest
expenditure on the real interest rate.
7 In order to prevent the
deficit of the total balance from being higher than the interest
expenditure paid as inflation compensation, the operational
balance must not show a deficit. Consequently, the surplus of
the primary balance must be at least equal to the expenditure
to be paid on the basis of the real interest rates.
Against this background it is possible to quantify the potential
size of fiscal deficit in each year without an increase in the real
value of government debt. In addition to the value of
government debt, the long-term projection of domestic and
foreign inflation rates is also needed for the calculation of
inflation compensation. The result greatly depends on the
inflation forecast. Assuming an average 3 per cent inflation in
the coming decade and an average debt of 66 per cent (year
2015 value at a 3 per cent economic growth, see Table 1),
multiplying this 66 per cent with the 3 per cent inflation rate
we see that an average 2 per cent fiscal deficit must be
attained in order to avoid an increase in the real value of
government debt. The value of inflation compensation as a
ratio of GDP, i.e. the potential deficit consistent with real
debt rule, closely followed inflation trends in the recent
period. The budget deficit exceeded the magnitude of
inflation compensation every year, which resulted in a rapid
increase in total debt. The time series of the inflation
compensation as a ratio of GDP also shows how high the
budget deficit would have been in recent years if the
operational deficit had been balanced (see Chart 4).
EVALUATION OF THE FISCAL
FRAMEWORK
The properties of the newly adopted set of rules are
examined below on the basis of an internationally accepted
set of criteria (Kopits–Symansky criteria). This analytical
framework allows a concrete rule to be described on the basis
of eight criterion types.
1. The first criterion which can be examined is whether the
rules are sufficiently well defined. Namely, whether the
indicator to which it pertains or the coverage of institutions
to which it applies is well defined, and if there is any escape
clause. The clause may specify under what conditions fiscal
policy may be exempted from complying with the rule. The
Kopits–Symansky criteria mention the traditional (nominal)
deficit indicator and the broadest coverage of institutions as
positive examples. Owing to their measurement difficulties
and evadable character, the current balance excluding
investments and the exclusion of the so-called quasi-fiscal
activities, which are recorded outside general government,
are cited as negative examples. In the Hungarian fiscal
framework, primary balance is closer to the positive, while
separation into mandatory and discretionary items is closer
to the negative example. At the same time, its definite
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7The MNB prepares quarterly statistics using one of the methods of calculating operational balance, excluding inflation. 
See: http://www.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx?ResourceID=mnbfile&resourcename=ahtadatok2_hu.
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The relationship of inflation, inflation compensation



























Deficit of central government
Inflation (right-hand scale)strength is the inclusion of public-purpose investments
made by the private sector (PPP) under the scope of the
rule, and recording the balance of state-owned companies.
Due to the latter, with the exception of their investments
the effect of quasi-fiscal activities appears in the deficit.
Since the rule applies to local governments only to the
extent of their central subsidies, for wider coverage it
would be important to expand the scope of the regulation
in some form to local governments as well.
8 The primary
balance and the balance of discretionary items by
themselves represent a narrower category than total deficit.
However, the primary balance is rather well definable,
while the balance of discretionary items can be less
accurately defined (due to the borderline cases between
them and mandatory items). The terms used in the rule are
precisely defined in the law.
9 On the whole, the definition
of the rule can be considered as rather favourable.
2. Another criterion to be looked at is how transparent the
operation of general government is. This includes the
assessment of accounting rules, the forecast and
institutional solutions. Negative examples are the obscure
objectives of fiscal policy, the practice of creative
accounting as well as the deliberate misinterpretation of the
size and timing of future fiscal liabilities. The functioning of
the fiscal rules of New Zealand can be mentioned as a
positive example. These contain both cash- and accrual-
based accounting, and strive to take into account the full
scope of liabilities. The Hungarian fiscal framework is a
modified cash basis, i.e. different from the modified
accrual-based accounting of the statistical definition of the
Maastricht criteria (ESA). The advantage of the cash-based
approach is that it makes verification easier and it is more
quickly available. Moreover, debt is also of a cash-based
approach, and according to New Zealand experiences it
complements the accruals approach very well in economic
analysis too. The Hungarian rule also takes into account a
significant part of future fiscal liabilities in a way that PPP
investments are recorded as early as at the date of the
activation, instead of spreading it over time. Most of quasi-
fiscal losses also appear due to the fact that the losses of
state-owned companies must be recorded (with a delay of
one year) when their balance sheet is prepared. The Fiscal
Council plays an important role in ensuring transparency.
By preparing macroeconomic forecasts and baseline
projections, this independent institution provides the basis
for the impact analysis of external factors on the one hand,
and of the measures on the other hand. This way it can
ensure the effectiveness of transparency in the preparatory
and adoption phases of the budget act. Overall, in terms of
fulfilling the transparency criterion the set of rules can
again receive a favourable evaluation.
3. The evaluation of the adequacy criterion of the rule seeks
to answer whether the rule attains the set target. In the
literal sense, the rule aims at keeping the debt constant at
real value, which results in a reduction of the government
debt-to-GDP ratio if economic growth is positive. The
condition that the GDP growth rate should be positive will
most probably be met. On the other hand, the rule does
not apply to local governments; therefore, its success also
depends on whether the current or a new fiscal rule limits
the increase in local governments’ debt in an adequate
manner. Considering the current local government rule,
this may take place over the medium term at best. The
fiscal framework may on the whole be suitable for
achieving the target set.
4. A criterion close to the adequacy aspect is the matter of
consistency. Based on this, it can be examined whether the
individual elements of the fiscal framework and other means
of economic policy are in harmony with one another. The
consistency of the Maastricht deficit and debt criteria can be
given as an example. The change in deficit is consistent with
the changes in net financial assets, but not with the change
in gross debt. However, this inconsistency may limit certain
forms of creative accounting.
10 At the same time, the deficit
ceiling of 3 per cent of GDP and the gross debt ceiling of 60
per cent are numerically in conformity with one another if
certain parameters are met. The methodology of the
Hungarian fiscal framework is different from the statistical
definition of the Maastricht criteria (ESA). On the one hand,
instead of the accrual basis it is built on a modified cash
basis, because the cash deficit is consistent with the change
in debt. On the other hand, as opposed to the ESA, the fiscal
framework does not contain local governments. By contrast,
it includes the losses of state-owned companies and PPP
investments, which restricts creative accounting. The total
effect of these methodological differences may amount to
1/2 per cent of GDP, i.e. on annual average, the deficit
measured with the methodology of the Hungarian rule may
exceed the ESA deficit by this much. Accordingly, the set of
rules can numerically be in line with the ESA deficit, because
if it is obeyed, an ESA deficit below 3 per cent can be
expected. It is also in accordance with the 60 per cent gross
government debt and the 1.6 per cent minimum benchmark,
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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8 In terms of the maximum level of indebtedness, the current regulation regarding local governments’indebtedness is not strict enough, and it does not limit the deficit
path leading to indebtedness either. In other words, until the debt ceiling is reached, extreme deficits are also possible in some years.
9The only deficiency is that the management of foreign currency debt (e.g. revaluation) is missing from the establishment of real debt.
10 Non-market government lending may evade the deficit measured by the ESA statistics (at least until the date of cancelling the loan), but cannot circumvent gross
debt.which protects the ESA deficit ceiling and represents a safety
margin, and it gradually approaches these levels (see Table 1
and Chart 4). Unchanged real debt postulates a balanced
operational position, and the difference between the latter
and the traditional (nominal) deficit is the inflation
compensation included in the interest payments. Therefore,
if the half per cent methodological difference is taken as a
basis, a 1.6 per cent ESA deficit equals a 2.1 per cent
inflation compensation, which means, let us say, that the
minimum benchmark can be attained if inflation and debt
amount to 3 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively.
11 All of
this means that for the sake of faster debt and deficit
reduction a surplus could be envisaged instead of the
balanced operational deficit. This can be achieved in line
with the rule, as the balanced operational position is
indicated as an upper limit, and a better balance can be
envisioned at any time. To sum it up, the Hungarian fiscal
framework and its methodology do not harmonise perfectly
with the fiscal framework of the EU. The disadvantage of
the methodological difference is the lack of local
governments, while its advantage is the limitation of creative
accounting. Otherwise the set of rules is consistent by itself
and with other means of economic policy.
5.  The criterion of simplicity means how easily
understandable a rule for politicians, voters and investors
is. The requirement of a balanced budget is mentioned as
a positive example in the Kopits-Symansky study. In terms
of simplicity, the earlier rule of the Netherlands is an
unfavourable example, where the structural deficit was
targeted, as the cyclical adjustment of deficit represents
serious methodological difficulties, and it is hard to
present it in a simple manner. From the aspect of
simplicity, the Hungarian fiscal framework cannot receive
a favourable evaluation. On the one hand, it consists of
several interrelated elements; it contains the objectives and
the means at the same time. On the other hand, it is not
simple methodologically either; in addition to the
separation of mandatory and discretionary items, it also
postulates the exclusion of revaluation.
6. The criterion of flexibility requires the rule to allow for
flexible adjustment in the event of unexpected external
shocks. For example, a budget which is balanced in every
year does not let automatic stabilisers function in the
period of an unexpected economic downturn, because
missing tax revenues have to be offset immediately (even
during the year) by restrictions on the expenditure side (or
by tax increase). By contrast, the cyclically adjusted (or
structural) deficit or the fiscal balance attained over the
medium term makes it possible that fiscal policy does not
have to react to the downturn. The Hungarian fiscal
framework is highly flexible because it does not force an
immediate reaction of fiscal policy to unexpected external
shocks (economic cycle, inflation, etc.). Instead, it provides
a deadline for correction of 3 years. By reason of economic
policy considerations it is of course possible that certain
shocks still have to be reacted to faster.
7. The criterion of enforceability refers to the extent up to
which the effectiveness of the set of rules is guaranteed by
law, and what safeguards are assigned to it. The penalty
(which can be of financial, judicial or reputational
sanctions) imposed in the case of non-compliance with the
rule can be mentioned as an example. Another means can
be an independent institution, which is responsible for
overseeing the compliance, methodological requirements
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11 It is even more difficult to predict compliance with the medium-term objective (MTO). Hungary can start approaching the MTO after joining the ERM II. At present,
the accepted value of the MTO in Hungary is a 0.5 per cent structural deficit, which corresponds to 1 per cent inflation compensation. On the one hand, however, the
value of the MTO can be reviewed from time to time, for example a higher medium-term deficit may be allowed if debt becomes lower in a country. On the other
hand, the calculation of structural deficit is also affected by the methodology of calculating the economic cycle, for which, in addition to the methodology currently
applied by the EU, there are several international methods which give different results.
The  automatic stabiliser effect means that the tax revenues of the
general government follow the fluctuations of the economic cycle,
while its expenditures change independent of private economic
activity, and they are relatively stable without extraordinary measures.
Accordingly, fiscal balance improves in times of economic upswing,
while in times of downswing it deteriorates without the government
having to take any measures. As the movement of the net demand
generated by the government is exactly the opposite of the private
sector, it is smoothing the fluctuations of the private sector.
Expenditure rules which are not related to current economic
developments have a fluctuation reducing effect like this. Pursuant to
the act, the growth rate of expenditures has to be determined three
years in advance, which connects the growth rate of expenditures to
the trend in economic growth, rather than to the actual growth rate.
The escape clause that the government does not have to react to
unexpected developments in external factors (economic cycle)
neither when preparing, nor when implementing the budget has a
similar effect.
Box 2: Budgetary effects of automatic stabilisersand procedural rules of the regulation. In the Hungarian
fiscal framework, the consequence of the departure from
the rule may be the loss of good reputation, which may
entail financial consequences as well if market confidence
is shaken. It would be essential also for voters to consider
the compliance with the rule important, because in the
case of non-compliance would have political consequences
as well. In the course of budget planning and the adoption
of the budget act the Fiscal Council can control the
functioning of the rule to a certain extent. Subsequent and
comprehensive audits can be performed by the State Audit
Office. However, in terms of enforceability it is
disadvantageous that the act on the fiscal framework was
adopted by Parliament by a simple majority. With regard
to the current situation it may indicate that the rule does
not enjoy full support, while concerning the future it
makes the whole rule simply revisable or terminable. A law
adopted by qualified – two-thirds – majority and especially
the amendment of the Constitution proposed in the
package of public finances acts would have reinforced the
rule, and would have made it more credible so that it
would be respected. Overall, in terms of enforceability the
assessment of the set of these rules is not so favourable.
8.  The criterion of efficiency examines whether the
functioning of the fiscal framework contributes to the
sustainable expenditure-revenue structure. The Kopits-
Symansky study mentions that feature of the EU’s fiscal
framework as a negative example that some member
countries managed to achieve the 3 per cent reference
value of the deficit-to-GDP ratio only through recourse to
one-off measures. Moreover, rules based on balance-type
indicators may be achieved by various combinations of
revenue-increasing and expenditure-reducing measures.
Accordingly, a deficit criterion can also be met through a
tax increase which cannot be sustained over the medium
term. It is also true for the structural deficit, where the
one-off measures in principle have to be excluded, but
there is no obstacle to tax increases or temporary
restrictions on investments. Compliance with an
expenditure rule requires measures on the expenditure
side, but it is not guaranteed here either that permanent,
and not temporary, steps are taken. Generally, it is true
that the various rules represent some kind of an aggregate
limitation, and compliance with the rule by itself does not
mean that it is done in a sustainable expenditure-revenue
structure. Efficiency is guaranteed the least in the case of
balance-type rules, while structural deficit or expenditure
rules are more favourable in terms of efficiency. In the
course of setting the targets, the Hungarian fiscal
framework starts from a balance-type indicator on the one
hand and from an expenditure rule on the other hand.
However, as time passes, the possible scope of measures
becomes narrowed to the expenditure side or the
discretionary items which can freely be changed by the
decision-makers. In addition, the scope of one-off
measures is limited by the methodology which brings
quasi-fiscal corporate losses and public-purpose
investments implemented in the form of the PPP model
under the effect of the rule.
The Kopits–Symansky study, which set up this set of criteria,
emphasises that no set of rules is able to meet all the criteria
simultaneously, and a trade-off between simplicity and
efficiency or between flexibility and enforceability may
evolve. In deciding which criteria should be given preference,
it is always what is more important in terms of the needs of
the given country that is decisive. Based on our above
assessment, the Hungarian fiscal framework is essentially
well-defined and transparent, it may be adequate for
attaining its objective, it is generally consistent, and has an
average efficiency, although all this is realised at the expense
of simplicity. At the same time, its limited enforceability is
not related to its high flexibility, but rather to the fact that it
is not supported by an act adopted by qualified majority.
CONCLUSION
The new Hungarian fiscal rules constitute an essentially well-
defined and transparent system, which can achieve its set
objective. In setting the medium-term objective, it envisages
unchanged real debt, i.e. a minimum zero operational
balance. Owing to methodological differences, consistency
with the EU’s fiscal framework is difficult to judge. The set of
rules is clearly in line with the provisions of the Maastricht
Treaty; application of the rules allows compliance with the 3
per cent deficit ceiling, and debt may also be reduced below
60 per cent gradually. At the same time, as for the
recommendations of the preventive arm of the EU’s fiscal
framework the balanced operational position may still prove
to be insufficient in the coming years. However, the rule
allows that if it is expedient for fiscal policy, an operational
surplus of such size can be envisaged which ensures a faster
reduction of deficit and debt. The rule is flexible, as the
actual annual deficits can fluctuate around the path targeted
on the basis of the real debt rule, because over the short term
the rule ‘ignores’ the effect of the fluctuation of the interest
expenditure or the cycle. Systematic deviation from the
targeted debt path may be prevented by two factors. On the
one hand, this can be safeguarded by the baseline projection
prepared by the Fiscal Council, which is in principle
undistorted. On the other hand, the rule that possible
overshooting in debt cannot result in a change of the trend,
but adjustment to the path excluding the outlier has to be
carried out when setting the debt target. However, the
inevitable cost of these favourable properties is that the rule
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MNB BULLETIN • MAY 2009 22cannot be considered simple. As we have seen, one of the
pillars of the successful functioning of the rule is the work of
the Fiscal Council. Another factor enhancing the credibility
of the fiscal framework may be the demonstration of political
support. One of its elements would be the creation of an
adequate rule applying to local governments as well as a
statutory reinforcement of the enforceability of the current
rule (for example by adopting a law which requires qualified
majority).
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